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Abstract
The nationalistic rhetoric adopted by the newly-elected president’s administration along with
the public’s climaxing anti-immigrant hysteria has recently forced Mexican immigration
intervention to the top of the U.S. agenda. Misconceptions regarding Mexicans’ role in stealing
jobs, threatening cultural and ethnic traditions, and straining public welfare, educational, and
healthcare resources have spurred a fear among the American people. This politically-fabricated
“schizophrenia” has ceased the political and economic collaboration between the two nations and
has resulted in the unilateral militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. In this evaluation of the
U.S. government’s immigration policies, the proposed economic theories related to Mexicans’
motivations in crossing the border, and the data collected from border-crossing participants, it is
evident new policy measures need to be implemented to reflect these nuanced trends which stand
contrary to conventional wisdom. This research examines the motivations of Mexican immigrants
to cross into the U.S. using data collected by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in collaboration with
several Mexican government agencies. These parties conducted qualitative surveys with Mexican
migrants that evaluate the dynamic, magnitude, and characteristics of the migratory flow across
the U.S.-Mexico border. The analysis aims to evaluate if economic motivations are moderated by
U.S. or Mexican macroeconomic conditions and if a trade-off exists between motivations for
crossing, specifically if economic motivations and those related to social capital theory are
substitutes and uphold an inverse relationship. Results indicate a classic trade-off does exist among
motivations to cross under specific U.S. macroeconomic conditions and both economic and noneconomic motivations to migrate are influenced by U.S. but not Mexican macroeconomic
indicators. Based on these findings, an analysis of specific policy reform measures and binational
solutions needs to be considered for future legislation to help resolve this multifaceted reality in
the long-term.
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I.

Introduction
The debate concerning Mexican immigration in the last decade has become bifurcated in

nature, creating two distinct postures influenced by diverging ideological claims and emotional
arousal. One on side, proponents of the suspension of Mexican immigration argue the surge of
Mexican immigrants in the U.S. threatens the ethnic, political, and sociocultural composition of
the U.S., negatively impacts U.S. economic infrastructure (as it fosters a growing dependence on
“race to the bottom” practices and depresses nominal wages), places stress on natural resources
stretched across a growing populous, and exponentially accelerates criminal activity (Light &
Togunde, 2008, p. 279). Fueled by the changing political landscape and selective coverage of the
media, this group has painted the Mexican migrant population as a threat against pure
“Americanism.” Conversely, the opposing stance argues the integration of the Mexican population
into the U.S. not only cultivates linguistic and cultural diversity but fosters essential U.S.
macroeconomic growth. The pro-immigration defenders position Mexican immigrants as
productive assets, largely performing work avoided by natives, providing a supply of cheap labor
which translates into cost-saving benefits for consumers, and paying more in taxes than consuming
in social services (Light & Togunde, 2008, p. 280). These ideological discrepancies have shaped
the national conversation regarding Mexican immigration. Historically, political figures have
leveraged Americans’ sensationalist fear of Mexican immigrants overriding the country to further
a nationalistic discourse and grow their popularity within their party. The statistic sustaining the
anti-Mexican immigrant hysteria within the U.S. population through shifts in the political
landscape relates to the publicly-perceived “growing” undocumented immigrant population. The
Pew Research Center in 2016 calculated that in 2014 (see Figure 1) the unauthorized immigrant
population in the U.S. was 11.1 million and this population has stabilized since the end of the U.S.
Recession in 2009 (Passel & Cohn, 2016). Contrary to conventional wisdom, this estimation is not
fully comprised of Mexican immigrants as only 52% of this unauthorized population are of
Mexican origin (Passel & Cohn, 2016). While the total number of undocumented immigrants rises
in the U.S. until 2007 (see Figure 1), the percentage of Mexican immigrants representing this
undocumented population has continued to fall since compared to immigrants of other
nationalities. This population most dramatically falls after its peak of 6.95 million in 2007 as seen
in Figure 2 (Pew Research Center, 2016). This graphical depiction demonstrates the “reversal”
pattern of the increasing illegal immigrant population in the U.S. However, despite this data-driven
3
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reality, distorted facts, misconstrued enthusiasm, and political fervor continue to taint the present
immigration saga in the U.S. This narrative of the decline in the Mexican undocumented immigrant
populous brings to question what driving forces play an impactful role in the deterrence and
incentivization of Mexican migration to the U.S. and the facilitation of return migration back to
Mexico. While proposed policy “quick fixes” such as the construction of a wall along the U.S.Mexico border and mass deportation seem to tarnish North Americans’ Mexican immigrant
anxieties, these attempts fail to evaluate or resolve the core of the Mexican immigration
phenomenon: Mexicans’ motivations to migrate.
While previous studies on Mexican immigration have focused on a quantitative assessment
regarding the impact of Mexican migratory flows, prior research has yet to thoroughly apply a
qualitative perspective. This nuanced approach prioritizes the evaluation of Mexicans’ motivations
to migrate to the U.S. as rationale to shape future policy initiatives. Thought leaders in this research
domain consistently present findings grounded in the analysis of annual migration crossing figures
and the effects Mexican immigration has on native employment conditions and wage prospects,
disregarding the Mexican migrant’s perspective and predominantly fixating on the “American”
point of view (Borjas, 1990; Fix & Passel, 1994; Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 1978; Borjas & Katz,
2005; Anderson & Gerber, 2008; Escobar-Latapi, 2016). By reorienting the immigration
conversation around exploring why Mexican migrants cross into the U.S., it helps determine the
principal causes that spur transnational migratory flows across the U.S.-Mexico border. This
perceptual shift in evaluation methodology posits policy considerations regarding the U.S.
immigration system should complement Mexican migrants’ personal rationalization in deciding to
migrate—a framework yet to be recognized or implemented to any degree at the legislative level.
This research focuses on testing Mexicans’ economic and non-economic motivations to migrate
to the U.S. against several U.S. and Mexican macroeconomic indicators to determine their impact
on the decision to migrate. Based on several theories regarding international migration applied to
the Mexican immigration narrative, it is hypothesized that favorable macroeconomic conditions in
the U.S. will cause a demand-pull attraction facilitating the upward migration of Mexican
immigrants to the U.S. While the motivations for immigration are multiple, this study focuses on
economic and non-economic factors including family reunification and visitation and posits that a
trade-off will exist between the economic and non-economic (familiar) rationale with regards to
deciding to migrate. Overall, assessing Mexican migrants’ reasons for traveling to the U.S.
4
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represents a nuanced approach in addressing the complexities of the Mexican immigration crisis
and its growing polemics. Furthermore, an empirical analysis of these intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations humanizes the national dialogue and proposed political action regarding Mexican
immigration. It places value on the attitude and personal demeanor of the individual immigrant
versus that of the society it aims to enter or assimilate into. Thus, considering Mexican migrants’
intention in crossing into the U.S. and how these intentions change in response to shifts in the
macroeconomic landscape provides a binational platform designed to balance the urgencies of the
Mexican migrant population with the physical and human capital demand of the U.S.
II.

Literature Review
To fully comprehend which forces facilitate the migration of Mexicans across the U.S.-

Mexico border, the mechanics of international migration need to be analyzed to reveal what
internal and external elements play an integral role in the migration decision and to what extent.
American sociologist and Princeton professor Douglas Massey has mapped out several theories
regarding international migration and applied them to the Mexican immigration phenomena
experienced in the U.S. Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) in their work entitled Beyond Smoke
and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration, aimed to identify the forces
in sending countries that promote out-migration, the forces in receiving countries that spur demand
for immigrant labor, the motivations of international migrants who respond to these forces, and
what social and economic infrastructures arise due to international migratory flows (p.9). The
authors developed a comprehensive explanation for international migration derived from the
application of neoclassical economics, social capital, new economics of labor, world systems, and
segmented labor market theories. In assessing how these theories potentially motivate Mexicans
to migrate to the U.S., these models serve as a basis for empirical analysis in this research to
determine and ensure their applicable legitimacy.
Neoclassical Economic Theory
The common understanding of Mexican migration to the American public stems from the
neoclassical economic theory which defines transnational movement as a simple cost-benefit
decision uphold by rationality and derived from the binational wage gap (Massey & Espinosa,
1997, p. 947). The theory and its extensions posit a macroeconomic and complementary
microeconomic application exist which facilitates Mexican migration to the U.S. According to the
5
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macroeconomic extension, “migration stems from macro-level processes of [the] supply and
demand” of labor between countries with unequal economic infrastructures (Light & Togunde,
2008, p. 283). Thus, countries like the U.S. with large endowments of capital, scarce labor
resources, and who offer better economic opportunities have higher wages than developing
countries. Conversely, countries like Mexico who have limited endowments of capital relative to
labor suffer from lower nominal wages due to the surplus of workers but scarcity of employment
opportunities within the country. The U.S.’s shortage of low-skilled labor and high demand for it
causes an increase in nominal wages in the U.S. relative to Mexico, increasing the binational wage
gap between the two linked economies. This resulting international differential provokes migratory
movement form the low-wage to the high-wage countries. As this upward movement of migrants
to the higher-wage country persists, labor abundance grows in the U.S. which then depresses U.S.
wages while labor scarcity in Mexico increases and consequentially nominal wages in Mexico
begin to increase. This transnational movement of labor moderates an international wage gap based
on these countries’ fluctuations in their demand and supply of labor; it also reflects the financial
and psychological costs of participating in migration (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 9).
The microeconomic extension of this theory assumes prospective Mexican migrants are rational
thinkers with good information who develop a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to migrate.
In this process, migrants first compare what they expect to earn in wages in the U.S. against what
wage they can maintain in their country of origin. Holding all else equal, if the U.S. wage holds a
higher monetary value relative to that in Mexico, the migrant then must weigh the expected
monetary and non-monetary benefits (higher productivity in terms of human capital investment
and wages) against the anticipated monetary and non-monetary costs (transaction costs and
psychological, cultural, linguistic, and occupational assimilation) of participating in international
migration. The theory postulates that if the expected net return of this calculation yields a positive
value, it would motivate a rational Mexican worker to migrate to the U.S. to exploit these perceived
opportunities and pursue a higher standard of living (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p.9). Thus,
the theoretical apparatus of neoclassical economics indicates that if wages and productivity in the
U.S. rise, it will entice Mexicans to assume the transactions costs and emigrate to take advantage
of the more “favorable” economic conditions in the U.S.
Though the neoclassical economics model applied to Mexican immigration is most
associated with an individual’s migratory decision, the U.S. government has enacted several U.S.
6
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immigration policy measures derived from the principles of this theory to justify the further
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. As the prospective Mexican migrant calculates the costbenefit analysis of migrating, the U.S. government has historically acted to deter Mexican
migratory flow by raising the transactions costs (financial, psychic, and material) and reducing the
perceived gains of crossing (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 940). In relation to the model, federal
regulations which increase the perceived cost of crossing will—theoretically—dissuade Mexicans
from migrating to the U.S. In reaction to these principles, U.S. authorities implemented several
programs and laws in the twentieth century to reduce the net benefit of migrating to the U.S. and
curtail illegal immigration (Massey & Riosmena, 2010, p. 297).
Historically, U.S. authorities aimed to implement a strategy of prevention through
deterrence to increase migration transaction costs specifically for the Mexican migrant population.
The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration Nationality Act, for example, represent a practical
manifestation of this theory. The legislation institutionalized family reunification as the objective
for a new visa allocation system that disproportionately favored immigrants of U.S. families over
skilled workers. It imposed an annual visa supply cap of 120,000 for countries in the Western
hemisphere which forced Mexicans to compete with other Latin American immigrants for the same
numerically restricted visa supply (Massey, Durand, Malone, 2002, p. 40). These measures
implicitly increased transactions costs for prospective Mexican migrants as their probability of
successful entry became limited by the decrease in the visa supply. As a result, costs regarding the
application process increased in terms of fiscal value, time, and convenience. An infamous effort
to control the illegal immigration of Mexicans, protect the economic security of the U.S.
workforce, and promote the nation’s sovereignty in response to the rising anti-immigrant climate
was the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. Its congressional
measures allocated more financial capital, personnel, and other resources to the border to increase
U.S. Border Control enforcement which increased the perceived probability of apprehension and
deportation. Additionally, it imposed sanctions on U.S. employers who hired illegal immigrants,
positioning U.S. jobs as less attractive and increasing the risks of migration (Massey & Espinosa,
1997, p. 90). To further increase the transaction costs for Mexican migrants, various policies
sought to bar legal and illegal Mexican immigrants’ access to public assistance programs, public
education, and emergency medical services (Fix & Passel, 1994, p. 62-63). Furthermore, programs
like Operation Blockage and Gatekeeper at the El Paso, Texas and San Diego, CA metropolitan
7

Running Head: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEXICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM

crossing points respectively represented additional attempts to intensify border security through
the implementation of advanced technological infrastructures and an increase in the supply of onfoot U.S. Border Control personal (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 106). Based on the
ramifications of the neoclassical economics model, the U.S.’s unilateral effort in militarizing the
border should have decreased the perceived gains of legal or illegal entry. However, the reality of
this abstract concept failed to materialize in modern practice.
While the application of the neoclassical economics model serves as the only basis of
public understanding that explains why Mexicans migrate to the U.S., many academics dictate the
theory by itself is not sufficient to evaluate the current immigration crisis. Analysis suggests that
the practical manifestation of this theory does not hold empirically and that other theories and their
implications are needed to paint a more comprehensive picture of this increasingly complex issue.
In short, U.S. immigration reform has increased the transactions costs of immigration through
border militarization but despite these imposing financial and physical barriers, Mexican illegal
immigration has not only persisted but grown even in the absence of a wage differential (Massey
& Riosmena, 2010, p. 295; Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 963; Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002,
p. 10). The literature reveals Mexican migrants who do not have the monetary slack to enter the
U.S. legally pursue entry through undocumented channels, crossing through uninhabited, less
visible, and more rural settings which increases the probability of injury or death (Massey, Durand,
& Malone, 2002, p. 95-95, 113-114). This depicts the willingness of migration participants to
assume additional costs in migrating to the U.S. despite the high-risk climate. By circumventing
highly-monitored crossing points to avoid increased border enforcement measures, this suggests
Mexican migrants perceive the potential gain of working in the U.S. as still large enough to offset
the potential dangers of illegal immigration (Massey & Riosmena, 2010, p. 297). Thus, these
efforts geared towards deterrence have backfired while also further exacerbating the repercussions
of the U.S. immigration crisis. Though efforts to increase transactions costs were intended to
prevent the upward migration of Mexicans, it simultaneously yet unknowingly fostered permanent
migration, ceasing the flow of circular migratory movement (Durand & Massey, 2010, p. 27;
Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, 2007, p. 99). Based on unauthorized Mexican immigrants’
perspective, they reduce cyclical movements of return migration to Mexico to spare themselves
from the greater perceived risks of reentry, resulting in an unprecedented accumulation of
Mexicans residing north of the border (Fernandez-Kelly & Massey, 2007, p. 99). The neoclassical
8
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economic model fallaciously defines migrants as rational utility-maximizing actors who should
want to permanently reside in the U.S. to reap the prosperity of increased economic opportunity.
However, this simplistic account of permanent residency fails to observe the presence of several
anomalies trumping the assumption of a one-way flow of long-term migrants: the increasing
annual flows of remittances sent back to Mexico by migrants to increase the betterment of their
families’ lives and the incrementing outflow of Mexicans from the U.S. (Massey, Durand, &
Malone, 2002, p. 11, 62-63; Light & Togunde, 2008, p. 285-285). Empirical analysis suggests the
dynamic expansion of Mexican migration to the U.S. does not alone follow the simple changes in
the objective benefits and costs of international migration as U.S. governmental attempts to curtail
Mexican migratory flow based on these parameters have failed to do so. Since the effects of
restrictionist indicators have yielded miniscule results, the impactful effects of other theories of
international migration need to be considered to understand Mexicans’ intrinsic motivations to
migrate.
Social Capital Theory
A prominent theory widely acknowledged by the academic community relies on the rubric
of social capital formation as the basis for the initiation and perpetuation of international migration.
According to Massey and Espinosa (1997), social capital relates to the summation of resources
available and gains to be accrued by an individual due to mutual relationships (p. 951). In
application, larger family units in Mexican and Latin American societies embody social capital
and extend those bonds within a narrow radius of trust comprised of family and personal friends
(Fukuyama, 2001, p. 9, 11-12). For the Mexican migration narrative, having interpersonal ties with
former or current U.S. migrants represents a valuable social asset that can be leveraged to obtain
information and assistance that reduce the transaction costs and increase the expected net returns
to international migration (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 951). According to this theory, knowledge
is transferred between experienced and amateur migrants which decreases the associated risks of
transnational movement. These migrant networks ultimately serve as vehicles of information and
expertise that facilitate achievement in entry and assimilation in the U.S. labor market (Massey &
Espinosa, 1997, p. 952). Borjas (1990) explains how once a family member crosses into the U.S.,
they become a reliable and inexpensive source of information regarding U.S. social and economic
conditions; this information is then transmitted back to the country of origin to educate other
available network members (p. 177). Social capital provides a means of creating economic
9
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efficiencies and reducing transactions costs as those who participate in migratory knowledgesharing can bypass proposed formalities that increase the transaction costs of migration
(Fukuyama, 2001, p. 10). Social capital theory also elicits a self-perpetuating nature that continues
to promote and sustain Mexican migration. This dynamic indicates that with each consecutive
wave of migrants successfully leveraging the provided information and resources of their migrant
networks, it further decreases the costs (i.e. information and transactions) and raises the benefits
(i.e. increased probability of finding work and inexpensive housing) associated with migration for
the subsequent wave (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 952). Thus, each act of migration creates
additional social capital or in other terms, more migration-based knowledge, to garner successful
economic and social integration in the U.S. The aggregating effect increases the quantity and
quality of social capital by expanding the migratory networks and providing information derived
from a larger accumulation of U.S. migration experience.
The extension of social capital theory through these relational networks across the U.S.Mexico border also plays a statically significant role in fostering illegal immigration. Massey and
Espinosa (1997) indicate the quantity of social capital at a prospective immigrant’s disposal creates
the most impactful effects on undocumented immigration (p. 957, 965). Therefore, membership in
these social networks provides the cross-border coordination and resources to successfully
facilitate illegal entry and help alleviate the risks of the increased militarization of the border.
Massey and Riosmena (2010) observed the failure of U.S. enforcement efforts stems from the
powerful influence of social capital which encourages unauthorized Mexican immigration despite
increased efforts to provide more line-watch hours, supply more border personnel, or implement
more deterring tactics (p. 319). Also, U.S. enforcement policies have indirectly helped sustain the
social capital formation through the repercussions of the Immigration Control and Reform Act of
1986. IRCA granted amnesty to roughly 2.3 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. with
the overwhelming majority being of Mexican origin (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 952). Granting
legalization to this large group laid the foundation for the rapid accumulation of social capital as
the probability of Mexican residents having a relative or member of their social network legally
residing in the U.S. dramatically increased. These now “legal” immigrants could sponsor the
immigration—legal or illegal—of those within their migratory network, spurring additional
migration on a larger scale. Therefore, social capital is shown to not only be a leading motivation
for transborder movement but a prominent predictor of Mexican immigration as it serves as a self10
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perpetuating mechanism to foster the flow of migrants despite imposed restrictionist measures
enacted by the U.S. government.
New Economics of Labor Theory
Another model helping to describe why Mexican immigrants participate in international
migration stems from the new economics of labor theory which holds migratory movement as a
function of collective strategies aimed to combat macro-level market failures. Instead of migrants
taking advantage of the “temporary disequilibrium in geographically distinct labor markets” in
terms of wage variability—as proposed by the neoclassical economics—the new economics of
labor theory explains motivations to migrate in terms of managing risks and accessing capital
(Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 953). This theoretical reasoning positions migration as a form of
insurance, protecting the economic well-being of family units from unforeseen risks by promoting
income portfolio diversification. In application, to safeguard households from the occurrence of
market failures (such as the devaluation of the peso, price inflation, or crop failure in Mexico)
Mexican families can send members to different labor markets, such as the U.S. or the domestic
economy, temporarily. In this way, the family can continue to accumulate income to secure
economic earnings through remittances despite poor economic conditions in Mexico (Massey,
Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 11). Thus, Mexican migration serves as a mechanism to manage the
proposed risks of the market. Additionally, this understanding gives households the opportunity to
access capital previously not available in their country of origin such as the ownership of land,
businesses, or a home that will allow them to finance future production activities or purchases
(Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 954). International migration in this context derives from
collectivism ideals that value communal interests over that of isolated actors. Therefore, migration
to the U.S. is not only an attempt to grow lifetime earnings, but a strategy to increase the economic
stability and positioning of the family through diversifying risks. Due to the vulnerable state of the
Mexican population, with unreliable, volatile, and difficult to access credit, capital, and insurance
markets, migrants depend on international migration as a source of alternative income to protect
their families against “the vagaries of the business cycle and the dislocations of structural change”
(Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 11-12). Thus, macro-level forces exogenous to family units
help propel migration to the U.S. as families aim to ensure financial security that precedes the
market.
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Worlds Systems and Segmented Labor Market Theory
Both the world systems and segmented labor market models assume global and macrolevel conditions outside the realm of individual control and influence are sources of international
migration. The world systems theory dictates international migration stems from the changing
structure and scope of the global economy and countries’ active participation in globalization. The
theory indicates global capitalist developments serve as disruptive forces which elicit social and
economic transitions that ultimately displace individuals from their traditional livelihoods and
impel them to participate in transnational labor markets out of necessity (Massey & Espinosa,
1997, p. 955). Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) argue market expansion constitutes large
mobile populations apt to migrate to follow opportunities of employment as these global
developments may undermine the productivity of local economies (p. 13). In the context of
Mexican migration, globalization creates economic linkage between the U.S. and Mexico,
facilitating the movement of Mexican migrants to the U.S. to meet the proliferating labor demands
of the developed economy. The segmented labor market theory argues migration results from
inherent macroeconomic “pull” factors prevalent in developed economies as there exists a built-in
demand for immigrant labor to foster the prosperous progression of advanced industrial societies
(Massey & Riosmena, 1997, p. 954-955). In the Mexican migration narrative, the demand of
unskilled workers by U.S. employers spurs the upward migration of Mexican migrants as U.S.
businesses and industries have developed a chronic need for the abundant supply of low-wage
laborers (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 15). Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) explain
that since natives perceive poor wages, low occupational advancement, and harsher work
environments as unattractive, Mexican migrants fill this labor void as they do not obtain the
intrinsic motivation to work solely to achieve upward social mobility but see employment as
simply a means to earn income (p. 15-18). This sought-after labor force allows U.S. firms to lower
operational costs and increase their bottom line when production needs surge yet easily dispose of
these workers in response to declining demand, objectifying them as simply a means to an end
(Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 16). Regarding motivations to migrate, these theories posit
Mexican migrants’ personal desires to cross into the U.S. are weaker forces than the external
conditions shaping the interaction of global economies.
In analyzing these various methods that suggest several relational and structural forces spur
international migration, the following was hypothesized regarding the ramifications of
12
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neoclassical economics and the social capital theory. First, favorable changes in the U.S.
macroeconomic environment will facilitate a demand-pull motion stimulating upward Mexican
migration. Second, because of the prevalence and statistically significance of these two theories in
the literature, a trade-off will exist between the economic and non-economic (familiar) rationale
with regards to motivations to migrate to the U.S. The research purpose is to determine if the
individual motivations of migration participants align with the manifestations postulated by
neoclassical economics and the social capital theory. By testing Mexicans’ personal motivations
against changes in the U.S. and Mexican economic landscape, it will reveal migrants’ primary
reasoning in crossing and lead to an evaluation of current policy measures that monitor migratory
flow and future policy recommendations to better facilitate this binational movement.
III. Empirical Framework
Data Source
The data utilized for this research came from the Survey of Migration at Mexico’s
Northern Border (EMIF Norte), a collaborative project which began in 1993 between El Colegio
de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the National Population Council, the Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare, and other government departments in Mexico. The ongoing study aimed to
increase understanding of the phenomena of labor migratory flows between Mexico and the U.S.
and identify the flow’s characteristics, volume, trends, and determine its impactful effects on the
labor market in both neighboring societies (COLEF, 2013, p. 9-10). Representatives from these
involved institutions have conducted daily ethnosurveys with various Mexican residents to collect
demographic attributes and migration-specific information regarding their migration trips across
the U.S.-Mexico border. Based on the chosen analytical framework, the “Migrantes Procedentes
del Sur” database was selected which surveys Mexican residents who engage in the migratory flow
from Southern Mexico to the Northern Border region in Mexico (see Figure 3). This surveyed
population is comprised of Mexican residents 15 years of age or older, born in Mexico, who do
not live in the city of the interview, whose movement to the Northern Border region or the U.S.
stems from specific motivations, and who have no expected date of return to their place of habitual
residence (COLEF, 2013, p. 43). In turn, this population is further classified according to
participants’ final migration destination: those bound to a Mexican city in the Northern Border
region and those bound to the U.S. To test why Mexican migrants desire to enter the U.S., the
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filtered data set used in the empirical analysis only included observations of those who migrated
to the Northern Border region to leverage it as a crossing point into the U.S. from January 2010 to
September 2016.
Based on the outcomes depicted in Figure 4, the “Migrantes Procedentes del Sur” data for
the specified timeline indicates a sudden drop in the percentage of Mexican residents motivated to
migrate to the Norther Border region to continue in crossing into the U.S. Figure 4 represents the
percentage allocations of reasons why Mexican migrants came to the Northern Border region in
Mexico between January 2010 and September 2016. In examining the trend lines for the various
motivations—such as to work or look for work, reunite with family and friends, study, or change
residency—the percentage of Mexican migrants indicating their primary intention in traveling
north was because they were in transit to the U.S. drastically declined after September 2015. This
77% decrease in a two-month span represents a severe deviation from the south-to-north migration
narrative within Mexico compared to preceding years. Though the principle explanation for this
shift remains ambiguous, in June 2015, then-presidential hopeful Donald Trump announced his
candidacy for U.S. president (Diamond, 2015). During his presidential announcement speech, he
infamously positioned Mexico, its government, and its population as robbers of American jobs,
disproportionate benefactors of global trade, and the source of corruption jeopardizing U.S.
security and curbing U.S. economic progress (Ye Hee Lee, 2015). Due to the ramifications
depicted in Figure 4, it suggests the decrease in Mexican residents’ willingness to migrate to the
U.S. is a potential reaction to the anti-immigrant climate expressed in the U.S. political sphere,
halting any large-scale migratory movement from Mexico.
In analyzing the filtered data of the “Migrantes Procedentes del Sur” database, which only
includes Mexican migrants who indicated their travel to northern Mexico was only to cross into
the U.S., similar irregular fluctuations in motivations to migrate trends occurred. Figure 5 shows
the percentage of Mexican residents from the sampled population indicating their reason for
migrating to the U.S. from January 2010 to September 2016. The following motivations are
represented in these observations: to work, to look for work, to reunite with family or friends, to
shop or conduct business, to study, and to change residency. The motivations for crossing into the
U.S. “to work” (migrants who already acquired a position in the U.S. and thus in participating in
upward migration from Mexico, they are solely fulfilling that employment obligation) and “to look
for work” (migrants who have not received any form of formal employment upon migration and
14
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thus desire to cross into the U.S. to find work) represent manifestations of the neoclassical
economic theory. These economic motivations express Mexican migrants’ aspiration to enter the
U.S. to exploit the binational wage gap and leverage the proliferating demand for low-skilled labor.
The motivation for migrating to the U.S. “to reunite with family and friends” represents a noneconomic motivation and a phenomenon of the social capital theory. In application, when migrants
cross to visit family and close friends, they strengthen their social networks and participate in
knowledge-sharing which help decrease the transaction costs for latter waves of migrants. As
Figure 5 demonstrates, From January 2010 till roughly September 2015, the variation in the
percentages of Mexican residents’ motivations for migrating to the U.S. illustrates a consistent
narrative. However, after this date, the motivations of migrating to the U.S. to work, look for work,
and reunite with family and friends begin to converge, reflecting changes in the Mexican migrants’
perspective. The net results indicate the motivation to look for work has drastically fallen, while
that for already having work and visiting family and friends has shown an increase relative to
previous years. While the causation of these deviations remains unclear, speculation suggests with
recent changes in the U.S. political landscape and the more apparent protectionist rhetoric utilized
among the American people, Mexican migrants may perceive it too risky to migrate to the U.S.
for more “optimistic” reasons such as looking for work. Conversely, the graph portrays Mexican
migrants’ willingness to migrate to the U.S. for more knowable or legitimate reasons, such as
already having employment or having family or friends to visit in the U.S., increases as the
anticipated risk seems to decline.
Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
To test the manifestations of the neoclassical economic and social capital theories,
represented as the economic and familiar-based motivations to migrate respectively, a Probit
regression model was run to analyze these reasons for crossing against U.S. and Mexican
macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, equation (1) tests the economic motivation while
equation (2) tests the non-economic (familiar) motivation to migrate to the U.S.
Pr(Economic Motivation = 1) = Ф (β₀ + β₁Male + β₂Younger than 30 + β₃Crossed Alone +
β₄Can Read/Write + β₅Spoke English + β₆Frequency of Cross + β₇US UR + β₈MX UR
+β₉US GR + β₁₀MX GR)

(1)

Pr(Non-economic (Familiar) Motivation = 1) = Ф (β₀ + β₁Male + β₂Older than 30 +
β₃Crossed Alone + β₄Can Read/Write + β₅Spoke English + β₆Frequency of Cross + β₇US
UR + β₈MX UR +β₉US GR + β₁₀MX GR)

(2)
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As seen in Table 1, descriptive statistics included 44,017 observations from Mexican
migrants and captured basic demographic characteristics (gender, age, ability to read and write in
any language, and ability to speak English), migration-specific traits (frequency of crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border and whether migrants crossed alone or with others), and macroeconomic
indicators of both countries (monthly unemployment rate and quarterly GDP growth rate). The
macroeconomic variables for the U.S. and Mexico will be used to determine if Mexican migrants’
motivations to migrate align or are impacted to any degree by the respective economic climates of
these linked economies.
IV. Results
Model I
In the first Probit regression analysis, the economic motivation (41,936 observations in
total), which represents Mexican migrants who wished to migrate to the U.S. to look for work or
to work, was tested against the demographic, migration-specific, and macroeconomic variables
listed in Table 1. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate both the U.S. unemployment rate and the
U.S. quarterly GDP growth rate were statistically significant. This suggests that an increase in the
U.S. unemployment rate is associated with a decrease in the probability of Mexican migrants
crossing for economic reasons. Similarly, an increase in the U.S. quarterly GDP growth rate is
associated with an increase in the probability of crossing for economic reasons. Both economic
variables have the expected sign. In evaluating the demographic and migration-based variables,
Mexican migrants who crossed into the U.S. to work or seek employment are more likely to be
male, younger than 30 years old, not able to read and write, not able to speak English, and have
crossed the U.S.-Mexico border less frequently in their lifetime. Applying these conclusions to the
theories of international migration, they represent a consistent narrative to the neoclassical
economic theory explained earlier. For example, with a higher U.S. unemployment rate, the
transactions costs to migrate increase as from the Mexican migrants’ perspective, it is less likely
to find and retain employment in the U.S. as the demand for laborers decreases. When U.S. GDP
growth rate is positive, it increases the perceived benefit of crossing due to the assumption that the
U.S. is maintaining a healthy economic environment that prospective migrants can exploit to
obtain employment. Thus, changes in the U.S. macroeconomic condition influence Mexicans’
migration decisions. If Mexican residents are motivated to migrate to the U.S. for economic
16
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reasons, favorable U.S. economic conditions facilitate a “pull” and unfavorable U.S. economic
conditions curb migratory flow.
Model II
In the second Probit regression, the economic motivation to migrate is tested against the
various years represented in the data set to determine if Mexican migrants’ decision to cross for
economic reasons is significantly influenced by the year. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate
from 2011 to 2014 there is a monotonic increase in the likelihood of Mexican residents crossing
to the U.S. for economic reasons compared to 2015 and 2016. As seen in Figure 6, Mexican
residents were the least likely to migrate to the U.S. for economic reasons in 2011 (compared to
2015 and 2016) as demonstrated by the coefficient -.18. However, as time progresses (see Figure
6), the probability of crossing for economic reasons not only increases but the coefficients for these
respective years get more positive and larger in value as the U.S. gradually recovers from the Great
Recession. In application, this makes practical sense as 2010 and 2011 represented the tail-ends of
the U.S. recession that lasted from December 2007 until June 2009 officially (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2012). Yet, the lagging consequences still manifest in later years and these repercussions
continued to strongly influence Mexican residents’ migratory decision even after the Great
Recession “formally” ended though in a diminishing way. This extrapolation empirically
demonstrates migrating for economic reasons is heavily shaped by U.S. macroeconomic
conditions, specifically by this most recent U.S. economic downturn. Additionally, as the negative
effect of the U.S. Great Recession diminished, so, too, did the negative effect on this motivation
for immigration to the U.S., as the negative coefficients for ensuing years became positive by 2013
and 2014.
Model III
In the third Probit regression analysis, the familiar (non-economic) motivation to migrate
was tested against the demographic, migration-specific, and U.S. and Mexican macroeconomic
indicators summarized in Table 1. Again, this motivation represented a phenomenon of the social
capital theory in which the reason for migratory flow stems from reuniting with family and friends
who resided in the U.S. The results in Table 2 show the U.S. unemployment was the only macrolevel variable to hold statistical significance. The positive coefficient suggests any increase in the
U.S. unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the probability of crossing to the U.S. to
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reunite with family in friends. This finding indicates that in poorer U.S. economic conditions,
prospective Mexican migrants might perceive it too risky to migrate to the U.S. with the intent of
finding employment and will most likely cross to visit family instead. Validating the ramifications
of the social capital theory, these results posit despite disadvantageous macroeconomic indicators,
Mexican residents are still willing to migrate to the U.S. to further facilitate the transmission of
migration-specific information. As a result, this knowledge transfer from U.S. residents to
prospective immigrants will continue facilitate migration across the U.S.-Mexico border.
Historically, this is also consistent with the narrative of U.S. border enforcement in which
regardless of unfavorable conditions—whether policy measures aimed in militarizing the border
or a high U.S. unemployment rate in the case of this research—Mexican migratory flows have
endured (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 963; Massey & Riosmena, 2010, p. 295). Thus, the results
further emphasize the significant impact social networks have on propelling and sustaining
Mexican migration as they represent a discrete yet powerful force not fully recognized or leveraged
at the legislative level.
V.

Policy Implications
Based on outcomes of the regression analyses, there are several policy implications to

consider which can counteract these data-driven trends and contribute to a more efficientlymanaged U.S.-Mexico border. In the first regression model (Table 2), the data indicate from 20102016 favorable U.S. macroeconomic conditions (such as an increasing U.S. quarterly GDP growth
rate) represent a “demand-pull” indicator. These strong demand-pull or neoclassical economic
forces facilitate Mexican migration as they encourage Mexican residents to cross into the U.S. to
benefit from these economically optimistic circumstances. (Anderson & Gerber, 2008, p. 54). This
assumes prospective Mexican residents who desire to cross for economic reasons unilaterally
assess U.S. macroeconomic conditions prior to making a migratory decision and disregard the state
(favorable or unfavorable) of their own domestic economy. One policy suggestion to decrease
migrants’ dependency on the U.S. economic climate in choosing to cross is to focus on pro-growth
strategies for the Mexican economy, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico. U.S.
investment—resulting in possible job creation and economically-sound regulations—can increase
economic efficiencies in Mexico by potentially narrowing the wage and development gap between
the two countries. This action would help decrease the incentives to migrate if the economic
situation between the countries was more comparable. Specifically, Massey and Espinosa (1997)
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indicated that growth of direct foreign investment in Mexico reduces rather than increases the odds
of undocumented migration at the national level by “possibly creating jobs that provide domestic
alternatives to emigration” (p. 963). Furthermore, while investing in Mexico’s economic
infrastructure can reduce the influential power of U.S. macroeconomic conditions in the migration
decision, it also limits the probability of “supply-push” factors facilitating movement across the
northern border. In theory, the constitution of a more stable economy in Mexico reduces the risk
of domestic economic uncertainties such as unprecedented currency devaluations, high price
inflation, or sudden job loss (Anderson & Gerber, 2008, p. 56). The attempt to remove these
economic ambiguities by reinforcing economic frameworks will cease to “push” Mexican migrants
from their domestic communities. Thus, FDI counters the ramifications of the new economics of
labor theory as it halts participation in international migration even with favorable U.S. economic
conditions present. Initiating FDI would help narrow the twin gaps in economic infrastructure and
income and reduce Mexican migratory flow to the U.S. (Anderson & Gerber, 2008, p. 217).
Overall, FDI can be leveraged to combat the manifestations of neoclassical economics and
safeguard Mexico from unintentionally promoting international migration through economic
policies that create uncertainty.
However, results presented here suggest the demand-pull forces are very strong and may
persist despite economic conditions in Mexico. For instance, U.S. President Trump’s “America
First” agenda—his platform for a broader rejection of globalization that represents a deliberate
effort to serve predominantly U.S. interests in terms of foreign policy, national security, and net
economic benefit—plays an impactful role in the Mexican immigration narrative (“American First
Foreign Policy,” 2017). Specifically, an unintended consequence of Trump’s campaign promise
to renegotiate the provisions of NAFTA or withdraw from the multicountry trade agreement
altogether is that it may make Mexico’s economy worse off. With Trump’s administration
prioritizing economic nationalism, a renegotiation aimed to “put America first” might cause
Mexico’s economic infrastructure to give way, resulting in the exacerbation of Mexican
unemployment and poverty rates due to Mexico’s high economic dependency on the U.S. (Faux,
2017). Ironically, this agenda unintentionally drives more Mexican immigrants to the U.S. looking
for work due to Mexico’s resulting economic state. Thus, with the U.S. government aiming to
negotiate trade agreements that create favorable U.S. labor conditions (such as increased wages
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and ensured job security for its own citizens), these objectives create a demand-pull attraction
which still facilitate Mexican migration to the U.S.
While most Mexican residents expressed intentions to migrate to the U.S. for economic
reasons, current U.S. legislation does not provide a legal or enforceable means to sustain labor
mobility or repeat migration across the border. The data in Figure 5 shows that from January 2010
until October 2015, over 90% of the surveyed population indicated economic motivations (to work
and to look for work) for migrating to the U.S. while from November 2015 to September 2016,
economic reasoning for crossing represented anywhere from 62% to 100% of the surveyed
population. These statistics indicate the prominent reason to migrate to the U.S. from Mexico is to
work and look for work. However, current U.S. migratory policies aim to combat this effect
through continuous border enforcement instead of enacting policies that complement this trend.
This aggravates the serious damage to the economic, social, and political fabric of both countries
(Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 105). Presently, without crossing illegally, Mexican
residents can apply for a permanent resident visa to work in the U.S.—exacerbating the extent of
permanent migration—or apply for a tourist visa and overstay their allotted welcome to seek
employment (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 159; Fix & Passel, 1994, p. 70). Interestingly,
entering legally and then overstaying a tourist visa represents the leading form of illegal Mexican
immigration to the U.S., not physically crossing the U.S.-Mexico border clandestinely (Fix &
Passel, 1994, p. 4). Thus, no border wall—no matter how large—would prevent this from
occurring. Furthermore, legal visa supplies for Mexico only sufficiently cover 9% of potential
Mexican demand, insinuating a large share of migration is achieved through illegal means (Massey
& Espinosa, 1997, p. 957). Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Mexican perspective
demonstrates a consensus that migrating to the U.S. to work represents a recurrent strategy.
Mexican migrants’ disinterest in permanent migration is supported by a large percentage of them
sending remittances, or migradollars, back to their home communities and the vast repatriation of
U.S. savings when they return to Mexico (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 62). In 2015 alone,
remittances accumulated to $24.8 billion, representing 2.3% of Mexico’s GDP and replacing oil
revenues as the largest source of foreign income (Browne, 2017; Associated Press, 2016).
Additionally, 33% of undocumented Mexican migrants return within one year while roughly 85%
of Mexican migrants return within 5 years (Massey & Espinosa, 1997, p. 983). Thus, these findings
position migration to the U.S. as transient in nature, allowing Mexican migrants to make gains
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from the binational wage gap and protect their families’ assets from uncertain economic conditions
temporarily. With the research reflecting the association of circular migration with economic
motivations to migrate, U.S. policy measures need to be reoriented to cater to this phenomenon.
A solution to Mexican migrants’ intrinsic and economically-motivated desire for temporary
transnational movement is the implementation of a temporary visa worker program in the U.S.
Massey and Espinosa (1997) indicate a larger supply of visas available to the Mexican population
greatly reduces the odds of undocumented migration as the current restriction of the visa supply
by U.S. authorities forces Mexican migrants to pursue riskier and unauthorized forms of entry to
satisfy economic motivations (p. 963). Thus, the supply of these visas would help direct much of
the migratory flow through legal channels. Moreover, a guest-worker program would make the
need for employer sanctions established under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—
which criminalizes the hiring of undocumented workers—obsolete (Massey, Durand, & Malone,
2002, p. 159). The widespread reluctance by employers to enforce these provisions and the
sanctions’ inability to reduce undocumented hiring supports their own futility (Massey, Durand,
& Malone, 2002, p. 160) The eradication of these provisions in conjunction with a temporary
worker visa program grants Mexican migrants the legal right to work in the U.S. for a
predetermined period as their entry and employment no longer signify a violation of law.
Furthermore, due to U.S. businesses’ high dependence on the lower-wage employment of Mexican
immigrants, this program will provide a legal means to satisfy this labor demand in the U.S.
economy. Yet, unlike the Bracero program, these visas would require U.S. firms to uphold and
ensure employee protections that would prevent various forms of labor exploitation from occurring
(Hernandez, 2009, p. 26). Another benefit from this program would be the creation of additional
streams of revenue for the U.S. government. For example, the U.S. can attach a fee to the
temporary worker visa, providing instant U.S. revenue and ensuring a cheaper and safer means for
Mexican migrants to migrate in comparison to the cost and potential dangers of using a coyote, a
guide that facilitates informal border-crossing into the U.S. through illegal avenues (Massey,
Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 160). The prominence of Mexican migrants wishing to seek
employment in the U.S., as shown in Figure 5, suggests a high demand for these temporary worker
visas would follow. Other revenue gains include withholding taxes from these temporary workers’
paychecks and the demilitarization of the U.S.-Mexico border due to the newly infrequent
occurrence of undocumented immigration (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002, p. 160). Shifting
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resources and personnel away from the border and to the interior of the U.S. de-incentivizes
employers from hiring unauthorized workers and strengthens internal enforcement measures to
more efficiently control the existing illegal population within the U.S. (Massey, Durand, &
Malone, 2002, p. 162). Overall, the implementation of this program helps restore circular
migration instead of promoting linear transnational movement while matching willing Mexican
workers with willing U.S. employers (Anderson & Gerber, 2008, p. 221).
The data suggests social capital formation represents a potent force propelling Mexican
migration despite unfavorable U.S. macroeconomic conditions, and to curb the extent of this
phenomenon, a re-evaluation of the current visa allocation system is needed. From 2010-2016,
even with a high U.S. unemployment rate, Mexican migrants still expressed intentions to cross the
northern border to visit family and friends in the U.S. (see Table 2). This manifestation of social
capital theory indicates U.S. macroeconomic factors are not a deterrent for Mexican migration like
they are for those motivated by economic reasons. Namely, the poor U.S. economic climate does
not play an impactful role in Mexican residents’ migratory decision if they embody familiar-based
motivations to migrate. With the disposal of the country-specific quota system, the 1965
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act institutionalized family reunification as a
primary objective of the U.S. visa allocation system (Borjas, 1990, p. 31). For all immigrants, the
provisions require 80% of visas go to “close” relatives of U.S. citizens or residents while the
remaining 20% go to those obtaining desirable skills sought after by U.S. companies or which
meet U.S. economic needs (Borjas, 1990, p. 177). Additionally, these terms facilitate unregulated
entry of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, enabling them to bypass immigration formalities and
sponsor the entry of an increasing number other family members (Borjas, 1990, p. 31-32). Those
who benefit from this kinship bias in the preference system increasingly make visas more
expensive and competitive for other prospective immigrants. In the Mexican migration narrative,
these provisions facilitate social capital formation and foster chain migration as with an increasing
number of relatives residing in the U.S., this decreases transactions costs and explicitly encourages
the migration of additional family members (Borjas, 1990, p. 184). Prospective Mexican residents
can simultaneously leverage the favorable U.S. visa system and the informational exchange from
those within their social network to successfully cross into the U.S. The current system’s
parameters set the basis for the multiplier effect, exponentially fueling immigration based on
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family ties, and make U.S. macroeconomic forces ineffective in curbing Mexican migration. Thus,
the U.S. visa allocation system is insufficient in resolving the current Mexican immigration crisis.
Replacing the currently rigid policy approach with a sliding scale mechanism to determine
visa allocations can limit the ramifications of social capital theory while favoring skilled
immigrants who can contribute to U.S. economic growth. Borjas (1990) advocates to change
America’s offer in the immigration market to attract a more skilled immigrant flow which will
translate to higher financial gains to the U.S. economy (p. 162). In relation to this conjecture, the
percentage of visas allocated to family and skilled workers should be determined by the
favorability of U.S. economic conditions. With the adoption of a scale approach which adjusts to
changes in the macroeconomic climate, the U.S. can still balance the economic and humanitarian
tradeoff in its immigration policies. For example, in economically-prosperous times in the U.S.
the percentage allocation for visas can favor the entry of skilled workers to complement the
increased labor demand and the expansion of U.S. industries. However, in poorer U.S. economic
conditions, this visa percentage can shift to prefer the entrance of those who qualify under the
family-reunification parameter, allowing family and friends to visit their counterparts in the U.S.
In this way, migration motivated by the manifestations of social capital theory will be limited and
only widely authorized amid an unfavorable U.S. economic environment. However, the specifics
of when to change these parameters and to what degree need to be further debated and
conceptualized at the legislative level. The flexibility of this approach serves a binational purpose:
while the U.S. can manage who has legal access to enter the country and for what reason, Mexican
migrants can more easily participate in the U.S. labor force unattested without familiar ties and
still be able to cross to visit relatives.
VI.

Conclusion
The U.S. dynamics of Mexican immigration represent a multifaceted and complex issue

derived from the misguided efforts of political agendas, the sudden rise in anti-immigrant hysteria,
and the overall lack of genuine understanding of the Mexican perspective. The political, economic,
and geographical connectivity shared between the U.S. and Mexico indicates unilateral policy
decisions that do not consider the role of the Mexican immigrant cannot easily disrupt the inherent
transnational migration between the two countries. To gain insight into the Mexican migrant’s
perspective, this research links the micro- and macro-level forces which influence an individual’s
decision to migrate to the U.S. This nuanced framework aims to understand the frame of reference
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of the human subjects who willingly participate in this upward migratory flow and analyze how
changes in the macroeconomic environment impact their migration decisions. Results indicate
Mexicans’ motivations to migrate to the U.S. are strongly impacted by U.S. macroeconomic
conditions and suggest future policy considerations, such as foreign direct investment, temporary
worker visa programs, and new parameters for the current U.S. visa allocation system, should
reflect Mexicans’ rationale in deciding to migrate. This approach to identifying the causal factors
of Mexican immigration by incorporating the decision-making processes of the Mexican migrants
themselves deviates from traditional research methods and legislative practices. However, to create
and implement a more effective U.S. immigration strategy, Mexicans’ intentions to migrate need
to be capitalized on to mirror the reality of the immigration crisis.
In terms of limitations for this study, there existed several shortcomings in the selected
database as observations from the years 2010 to 2016 could only be used for statistical analysis.
An improved data set would include reliable information for prior years to determine if the
occurrence of significant macroeconomic declines experienced in the U.S. or Mexico would
influence Mexicans’ motivations to migrate to the U.S. Specifically, if the data were available for
the years during and following Mexico’s financial crisis in 1994 (sparked by the sudden
devaluation of the peso and the ramifications of capital flight), it could be determined if this
economic slow-growth in Mexico represented a “supply-push” factor, prompting Mexican
residents to readily participate in international migration to the U.S. Additionally, if data were
available during the years of the U.S. Great Recession, it could potentially provide a further
testament to the strength of U.S. macroeconomic conditions in influencing Mexicans’ migration
decisions. Access to data that includes motivations for migrating for these specified years can paint
a more comprehensive picture in how macroeconomic conditions help determine whether
Mexicans migrate to the U.S. and for what reasons.
While this research defines U.S. macroeconomic indicators as potent forces impacting
Mexicans’ decision to migrate, further research needs to focus on how this information is
communicated to the prospective Mexican migrant population. Studies speculating the mechanism
to which U.S. macroeconomic conditions are transmitted can reveal the potential informationexchange channels migrants leverage to evaluate the favorability of crossing, the type of
knowledge shared, and its directional flow among stakeholders. For instance, it can be
hypothesized that Mexican residents do not research this U.S. macro-level data through analyzing
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business-focused news outlets like the Wall Street Journal. Instead, prospective Mexican migrants
more likely trust the aggregate experience and expertise of their social networks to provide insight
into the U.S. economic climate. Additionally, social network members may not necessarily express
favorable U.S. economic conditions in terms of macroeconomic indicators (such as unemployment
rates and GDP growth rates) to members across the border. To gauge the health of the U.S.’s
economy, favorability in migrating is perhaps relayed in terms of employment availability.
Specifically, migratory networks possibly help connect potential migrants to specific jobs within
an industry well-known by its own members rather than simply giving general prospects for the
U.S. labor force. Overall, future research understanding the mechanism of these demand-pull
forces can further disclose the complexity in the transfer of migration-specific information and the
logistical nature and influential function of these social networks.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Estimated unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. from
1990-2014
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Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 2005-2014 based on augmented American Community Survey data
from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS); for 1995 and 2004 based on March Supplements to Current
Population Survey. Estimates for 1990 from Warren and Warren (2013). “Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized
Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009”
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Figure 2: Estimated unauthorized immigrant population of Mexican origin
in the U.S., 1995-2014
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from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS); for 1995 and 2000 based on March supplements to
Current Population Survey; for 1990 from Warren and Warren (2013) and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (2003).
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Figure 3: Surveys of Migration at
Mexico’s Northern Border

Source: Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México, 2011 by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and
Mexican governmental department affiliates with some translations (p. 42).
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Source: Data from the database entitled “Migrantes Procedentes del Sur” provided by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and Mexican
governmental department affiliates for the years Januaray 2010 to September 2016.
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Source: Filtered data from the database entitled “Migrantes Procedentes del Sur” provided by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and
Mexican governmental department affiliates for the years Januaray 2010 to September 2016.
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, LNSI14000000
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Economic Motivation
Familiar (Noneconomic) Motivation
Male

Description

Mean

Dependent Variables
Reason for migrating is to work or look for
.9527228
work in the U.S.
Reason for migrating is to reunite with
0.047209
family and friends in the U.S.
Demographic Characteristics

Std Dev

Min

Max

.2122335

0

1

.2120881

0

1

.943749

.2304084

0

1

.5877956

.4922372

0

1

Older than 30

Dummy: Gender is male
Dummy: Migrant is younger than 30 years
old
Dummy: Migrant is older than 30 years old

.4122044

.4922372

0

1

Can Read/Write

Dummy: Migrant can read or write

.9392053

.2389561

0

1

Speak English

Dummy: Migrant can speak English

.1413318

.3483674

0

1

.4950418

0

1

3.572197

0

96

0.0129467

0.047

0.099

Younger than 30

Migration-Specific Variables

US UR

Dummy: Migrant crossed the U.S.-Mexico
.5702797
border by themselves
How many times migrants have crossed
.7958289
the U.S.-Mexico border in their lifetime
Macroeconomic Variables
U.S. monthly unemployment rate
0.0813575

MX UR

Mexico’s monthly unemployment rate

0.049892

.0039174

0.037

0.058

US GR

U.S. quarterly GDP growth rate

2.075764

1.670129

-1.5

5

MX GR

Mexico’s quarterly GDP growth rate

.8262035

.4644177

-.8

1.5

Crossed Alone
Frequency of Cross

34

Running Head: CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEXICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY REFORM
Table 2. Regression Results

Male

Model Results I
(D.V. is Economic
Motivation)
Estimated
Std. Error
Coefficient
1.679895a
0.0296375

Model Results II
(D.V. is Economic
Motivation)
Estimated
Std. Error
Coefficient
1.680594a
0.0297024

Younger than 30

.2102893a

.2086761a

Variable

0.0240769

Model Results III
(D.V. is Non-economic
Motivation)
Estimated
Std. Error
Coefficient
-1.764618a
0.0329285

0.0241453

Older than 30

.441137a

0.0292451

Crossed Alone

-0.0054345

0.0243047

-0.0070667

0.0243066

.2166771a

0.0301816

Can Read/Write

-.2962122a

0.0612327

-.2879759a

0.0614939

0.0977304

0.0648071

Speak English

-.4322538a

0.0287681

-.443851a

0.0289016

.3693613a

0.0340273

Frequency of Cross

-0.0097066a

0.0022946

-0.0093325a

0.0022931

0.0143231a

0.0022766

US UR

-6.576514a

1.263438

7.80216a

1.503515

MX UR

-2.125079

3.665727

-.8329301

4.38243

US GR

0.0225997a

0.0069179

-0.0025953

0.008426

MX GR

-0.0215119

0.0282411

0.0434397

0.0343667

2010

-.146437a

0.0515596

2011

-.1846864a

0.0505503

2012

0.0767833

0.0525185

2013

.1348764b

0.057031

2014

.166368a

0.0617914

Notes: a, b, and c indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Reference categories for
Model II are the years 2015 and 2016.
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